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everything important about our lives can be explained by Darwinism. He 
displays a remarkable amount of religious fervor for an atheist. This, of 
course, is hardly unusual. (Consider, for example, devotees of Marxism.) 
Unfortunately, however, Dawkins's religious zeal is all (mis)directed to 
the Church of Natural Selection.
Divine Motivation Theory, by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 2004. Pp. xvii + 410. $75 (hardback), $29.99 (paperback).
JOHN LIPPITT, University of Hertfordshire, UK
In this ambitious, wide-ranging book, Linda Zagzebski puts forward 'a 
theological virtue ethics in which morality is driven by the attractiveness 
of the good,' and central to which is what she labels 'exemplarism' (p. xii). 
Through divine motivation theory, Zagzebski aims to challenge (though 
not necessarily contradict -  see p. 270) divine command theory, with its ten­
dency to focus on a conception of morality as law (that is, something that 
compels rather than attracts). Zagzebski divides her discussion into three 
parts. In part one, she sketches a type of virtue ethics that is 'motivation- 
based' (p. 1). This part of the theory is intended to be compelling natural- 
istically; it is not until part two that God becomes central. On this view, 
the moral properties of persons, acts and outcomes of acts all derive from 
a good motive, whereby what is meant is 'an emotion that initiates and 
directs action' (p. 1). Emotions, which for Zagzebski have an important 
cognitive dimension, are fundamental to her theory (see chapters 2 to 4).
Indeed, they are the foundation of ethics, as appropriate emotion en­
ables us to see the world aright. Her main philosophical inspiration is Ar­
istotle, and one of the most interesting aspects of her theory is the empha­
sis she puts upon his idea that we learn the good by ostensive definition: 
hence exemplarism. Zagzebski proposes that just as Kripke and others 
have suggested that natural kind terms such as gold or water should be 
defined as whatever is the same kind of thing as that (some 'indexically 
identified instance'), so the same method should be followed in ethics. On 
this model, the answer to the question 'What is a good person?' is always 
of the form 'Someone like that.'
In other words, not only is virtue basic, but we learn virtue through di­
rect reference to exemplars. Human moral growth and education involves 
picking out people who are paradigmatically wise or good, and imitating 
them. Just as someone without an education in chemistry can competently 
recognise gold when she sees it, so someone unable to give an account of the 
nature of practical wisdom can recognise a good, practically wise person 
when she sees one. 'We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of iden­
tifying the exemplars of goodness' (p. 41). Zagzebski addresses one obvious 
objection to this, the issue of variability of exemplars and ethical pluralism, 
in part three (chapter 9). Meanwhile part two (chapters 5 to 8) moves from 
the naturalistic to 'divine motivation theory' itself. Here, Zagzebski builds 
upon the arguments of part one to argue that the true foundation of ethics 
is the motives of God, the ultimate exemplar. She offers divine motivation
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theory as an alternative to two conceptions of morality as law, voluntarism 
and intellectualism. God is essential to morality not because the latter stems 
from his will or his intellect, but from his motives. These motives are compo­
nents of God's virtues, and God's exemplarity inheres in being 'the ultimate 
paradigm of goodness and the source of value' (p. 185). Much of part two 
concerns metaphysical issues, including discussions of traditional problems 
such as whether perfect goodness is compatible with omnipotence, freedom 
and moral goodness (chapter 7). It also contains Zagzebski's account of how 
divine motivation theory addresses the problem of evil (chapter 8). How­
ever, for this reader, the most interesting chapter in this part is chapter 6, 
where we move from chapter 5's discussion of the imitatio Dei to a very rich 
discussion of the imitation of Christ, which draws upon such diverse think­
ers as Irenaeus and Bonhoeffer.
For obvious reasons, exemplarism is able to give the incarnation a role 
of central moral importance. Zagzebski notes the difficulties of the imitatio 
Dei given a 'lofty metaphysical view of God': 'The more worthy of adora­
tion a being is, the less like human beings it is. We cannot imitate a being 
too far above us, and it is hard to have a relationship with a being who is 
not human' (p. 233). Hence the importance of that person who combines 
a divine with a human nature. The person of Christ, rather than a set of 
commandments, is the most perfect revelation of God (p. 237), and Zag- 
zebski notes the greater importance given in the New Testament to 'the 
imitation of the virtues of Christ' as opposed to commandment and law  
(p. 239). Even the injunctions that there are—such as the love command- 
ments—require us primarily to be motivated in a virtuous way. This chap­
ter also includes an interesting discussion about the importance of narra­
tives in relating ourselves to exemplars. This theme, which Zagzebski also 
discusses briefly elsewhere with reference to Martha Nussbaum amongst 
others, is one that it would be good to see worked out in more detail.
Various questions arise about this rich and thought-provoking book. 
First, Zagzebski opines that the problem of ethical pluralism discussed 
in chapter 9 cannot be solved without 'a theory of the self and the way in 
which the self revises itself' (p. 349). In this context, it is surprising that 
she makes no reference to Stanley Cavell's discussion of a view very close 
to exemplarism in such texts as Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome and 
Cities of Words. In discussing the logic of exemplarity, Cavell (and James 
Conant after him) has developed Emerson and Thoreau's idea of the self 
as 'doubled,' according to which we are able to take a critical distance 
from our current self and present a further state of the self that needs to be 
attained. On this view, it is precisely the exemplary other who discloses to 
us our 'next,' 'higher' self. In an interesting reflection on Nietzsche's view 
of exemplarity in 'Schopenhauer as Educator,' Conant discusses proper 
and debilitating forms of relating oneself to an exemplar, which I myself 
have connected with Kierkegaard's important distinction between 'admi­
ration' and 'imitation' in Practice in Christianity.1 It would be interesting 
to learn what Zagzebski would make of all this, given the closeness of 
this discussion of 'higher selves' to such observations as her idea that the 
imitation of Christ 'involves the attempt to become a new self, a self that is 
clearly myself, but also the self that I recognize that I am not yet' (p. 245). 
To mention but one point: Zagzebski notes the danger of 'inverted ego-
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ism' in relating to an exemplar: 'in identifying with my hero, I may begin 
to think that I am he' (p. 235). But the Cavellian tradition also puts great 
emphasis on the opposite problem: the way in which 'admiration' of an 
exemplar can be, in Conant's words, 'ethically impotent'; in this case, the 
hero is so far above me that I let myself off the ethical hook, thinking, as 
Nietzsche puts it, 'here there is no need to compete.'2 (Nietzsche, by the 
way, is an obvious counter-example to Zagzebski's claim that 'secular eth­
ics in the Western world differs from religious ethics, not so much in hav­
ing different exemplars, but in not having exemplars at all' (p. 384).)
Second, mention of Nietzsche prompts an important objection to a fun­
damental aspect of Zagzebski's theory. When introducing exemplarism, 
she suggests: 'If a theory has the consequence that neither Jesus Christ, 
nor Socrates, nor the Buddha is a good person, we should question wheth­
er the theory is a theory about what we call a good person' (p. 41). Here, 
perhaps, is the Achilles heel of her variety of exemplarism. Insofar as the 
scope of this 'we' remains unclear, Zagzebski is open to the objection that 
she may simply be ignoring the challenge to 'morality' of critics as radical 
as Nietzsche. If there is anything to his charge that the triumph of 'slave' 
morality has led to aspects of human flourishing more commonly associ­
ated with 'noble' morality being undervalued, then it is far from obvious 
how Zagzebski's form of exemplarism could recover them. (It is notable 
that another important contribution to the development of virtue ethics, 
Christine Swanton's recent book, affords a central role to Nietzsche.)3
A third point is prompted in part by Zagzebski's compelling suggestion 
(in chapter 9) that the way in which we 'revise' the self involves the 'second- 
person perspective' we get on ourselves from 'close interaction with others, 
particularly those others who are wise and who know us intimately' (p. 
372). Here, perhaps, we need a clearer distinction than Zagzebski provides 
between our day to day intimates and primary exemplars: those paradig­
matic good, practically wise persons such as Jesus, Socrates and Buddha. In 
trying to solve the problem of whether the life an exemplar desires is iden­
tical to the life the exemplar lives, she suggests that we find out by 'ask[ing] 
the exemplars' (p. 116). But Jesus, Socrates and Buddha do not hold regular 
office hours, and I assume that Zagzebski would not wish to endorse a 
view of prayer whereby relating to Christ is like arranging a chat with my 
pastor. In chapter 9's discussion of paradigmatically wise persons in differ­
ent religious traditions, the idea seems to be of wise Christians, Buddhists, 
Jews and Muslims, for instance, in the here and now. It is perhaps for this 
reason that Zagzebski segues into a discussion of what we can learn from 
our friends. This is natural enough, as Aristotelian ethics gives a special 
role to the 'virtue friend.' But this brings to light an important question: 
What are the relative advantages and disadvantages of self-transformation 
through our relations to exemplars such as Jesus, Socrates and Buddha, 
and self-transformation through our friendships at their best?
One major element Cavell stresses in Cities o f Words is conversation, 
and he explicitly connects this with Aristotle's discussion of conversations 
between virtue friends. Is Zagzebski's introduction of the wise friend who 
knows us intimately recognition of the need to complement our relation 
to primary exemplars with something more 'everyday'? If so, I suspect 
she is right. In his essay on friendship, Francis Bacon claims that 'the light,
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that a man receiveth, by counsel from another, is drier, and purer, than 
that which cometh from his own understanding and judgement; which is 
ever infused and drenched in his affections and customs.'4 It is not clear 
how relating oneself to an exemplar in solitude is likely to minimise this 
danger: the image of the exemplar may be insufficient to check my self­
deception. But conversations with (something like) an Aristotelian vir­
tue friend who genuinely has my best interests at heart can often reveal 
my confusions to me more directly, not least because such friendship is 
straightforwardly dialogical in a way that relating oneself to a primary 
exemplar cannot be. Although Cavell's hero Emerson talks of the exem­
plar as a 'friend,' this is potentially misleading, in that it fails to respect 
the distinction I am suggesting we need. Thus our imaginative relations to 
exemplars cannot replace our real friendships. Aristotle stresses the need 
for equality between virtue friends, but the relation between me and the 
truly exemplary is inherently unequal. I suggest, then, that our under­
standing of the model of self-transformation through encounter with the 
primary exemplars Zagzebski discusses, important though this is, needs 
to be complemented with the relatively mundane experience of conver­
sations between virtue friends. Zagzebski, I suspect, would not disagree 
with this, but she might be clearer about the relative weight that primary 
exemplars (Jesus, Socrates, Buddha) and derivative exemplars (the practi­
cally wise Christian or Buddhist friend) have in her theory.
On the other hand, we should perhaps not put too strong an emphasis 
on friendship. The sources for the second person perspective Zagzebski 
rightly valorises are not limited to primary exemplars on the one hand 
and our wise intimate friends on the other. Thus a further question that 
arises is this: What is the significance of the fact that we sometimes delib­
erately seek out advice from persons who are not our friends? Consider 
the importance of the professional therapist or counsellor in contempo­
rary western culture, to say nothing of the priest or pastor who may not 
know me intimately, but to whom I might go for advice because of rather 
than despite this. The range of potential exemplars is wide indeed.
In sum, this is a bold and ambitious book that will provide food for 
thought for philosophers of religion and ethicists with a broad range of 
interests. It deserves a wide readership.
NOTES
1. James Conant, 'Nietzsche's Perfectionism: A Reading of “Schopen­
hauer as Educator"' in Nietzsche's Postmoralism: Essays on Nietzsche's prelude to 
Philosophy's Future, ed. Richard Schacht (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). For my discussion of Cavell and Conant on exemplarity, see John 
Lippitt Humour and Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought (Palgrave, 2000), chap. 3. 
This includes a discussion of the difference between an exemplar and a type 
that is relevant to Zagzebski's discussion of 'incommunicability' (a central cri­
terion of personhood).
2. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, trans. R. J. Holling- 
dale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), § 162.
3. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
4. Francis Bacon, 'Of Friendship,' in Other Selves: Philosophers on Friend­
ship, ed. Michael Pakaluk (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), p. 205.
